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Abstract
This paper inquires into the effect of an additional immigrant upon
the incomes of natives in the U.S. It arrives at estimates of the com-
posite impact in each year following the immigrant's entry, and then a
present-value estimate of the entire stream of positive and negative ef-
fects in various years.
The paper first discusses the most important elements separately:
the capital dilution effect in Part II, where a new approach to estimat-
ing the proportion of the returns to capital captured by immigrants who
arrive without capital is sketched out; social security savings trans-
fers in Part III; and the Impact on productivity in Part IV, the sum of
learning by doing, creation of new knowledge, and economies of scale
of various sorts. Comparison of these partial analyses shows that the
life-cycle saving-and-transfer process works in a positive direction for
natives, and is of the same order of magnitude as the capital-dilution
effect. If Immigrants are assumed to receive a realistic proportion of
the returns to capital.
The effect of the immigrant upon productivity, however, must also
be taken into account though it has been omitted from previous theorizing
about the effects of immigrants. Assessment of this effect together
with the others requires a dynamic macro-model, and a simple one is sim-
ulated here. The results indicate that within a few years, the produc-
tivity effect comes to dominate the results and thereafter dwarfs the
capital-dilution and saving-and-transfer effects. Seen as an "invest-
ment", immigrants yield a very high rate of return to natives, on any
reasonable parameters.
June 12, 1980 revision of paper prepared for:
Conference on U.S. Immigration
Issues and Policies
April 10-11, 1980
Chicago, Illinois
THE OVERALL EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS
UPON NATIVES' INCOMES*
Julian L. Simon
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the two major aims of inquiry into the economic effects of
immigrants is to assess the overall effect of the newcomers upon the
average income of natives. To do so, one must take into account all of
the important effects, rather than focusing only on those most easily
embraced by theoretical and empirical devices. And these important ef-
fects must be combined in order to arrive at an overall net calculation.
To do this is the aim of this paper. The other main aim, understanding
the distributive effects, is left to other papers in this volume.
Section II reviews the theory of the effect of the allocation of
capital ownership, and sketches a new way of calculating that effect for
the U.S. Section III discusses the intergenerational transfer effect.
Section IV discusses the effect of immigrants upon productivity, which
has hitherto not been included in discussions of the topic, but which is
likely to be the most important of all effects in the long run. And then
Section V combines all these elements into a simulation model that esti-
mates the net on-balance effect of immigrants on the incomes of natives.
*I appreciate a helpful corrective reading by Paul Beckerman,
capable computer programming by Joseph Ben-Ur, criticism at the.jSbn-
ference by Warren Sanderson and other attendees, and useful suggestions
by Barry Chiswick.
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II. THE CAPITAL-OWNERSHIP EFFECT
Notation
A = level of technology and scale effects
d = discount factor
D = increase in total output in t due to immigrant, equal to
(Y° - Y°)
.
t t
G = gross income in year t
K = capital
L = labor force
m = index indicating a situation with immigration
n = index indicating a situation without immigration
s = savings rate
T = taxation
V = index for native population
Y = national income
V
Z = lifetime income of natives if there is migration
m "
V
Z = same but without migration
The prevailing theoretical approach from Malthus until recently
—
and still the prevailing popular view—is that immigrants lower the in-
come of "natives"* through capital dilution and diminishing returns.
*By "native" I mean those residing in the country previous to the
arrival of the immigrant in question. There is no good term in English
to cover this concept. Israeli writers on immigration use "veteran",
but this sounds unfamiliar in English. "Citizen" focuses attention on
legal rather than residential status. "Native" seems to exclude prior
immigrants, which I do not intend to do, but it seems to be the best
term nevertheless.
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The given endowment of capital, combined with more workers, yields less
output per average worker.
Then Borts and Stein (1964) and Berry and Soligo (1969) pointed
out that if immigrants do not share in the returns to capital, and yet
are paid their marginal product, the total returns to capital are in-
creased by more than the sum by which natives' wages are lowered; hence
Immigrants increase the average income of natives under these conditions.
This proposition is shown in Figure 1, taken from Berry and Soligo, where
the approximate-triangle X represents the gain to natives as a whole.*
Figure 1
Berry and Soligo made it clear that whether immigrants obtain rights
to the returns to the existing capital affects their impact upon natives'
average income. But Usher suggested that the gain to natives from the
"triangle" X is small compared to the loss to natives if immigrants cap-
*This line of reasoning implicitly assumes that there is only one
wage-earning occupation in the economy. If this assumption is relaxed,
the analysis is more complex. If there are a variety of occupations and
the immigrants come with the same distribution of skills as the natives,
then the result is the same as if there is only one occupation. But if
the immigrants come with a different distribution of skills, then there
are the same sorts of overall gains to trade that occur in international
trade of goods. On the other hand, the occupations that are dispropor-
tlonally represented by the immigrants suffer worse wage declines than
does the average. The Vietnamese immigrants of the late 1970' s, and the
Cuban immigrants of 1980, seem to have a broad spectrum of occupations,
whereas the Mexican seem to be largely semi-skilled laborers, so both
sorts of cases seem to be important. The general question of an effect
analogous to gains to trade was raised in conversation by Mark Rosenzweig,
and to my knowledge has not been analyzed. Hence I have no feeling for
how important it may be. But to the extent that it operates, it has a
beneficial effect on the average native's income.
•-a H
Ouartcicy of Labor
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ture part of the returns to capital, a demonstration I also made quanti-
tatively in an analysis of the effect of Russian immigrants upon "veteran"
Israelis' incomes (Simon, 1976). The task, then, is to estimate the pro-
portion of the return to capital that go to immigrants. And this is not
a simple or straightforward task.
Usher's approach was to estimate the value of the capital stock.
This method necessarily is fraught with all the well-known difficulties
of valuing existing industrial capital, plus the special difficulties
of valuing the physical and organizational capital of government, and
of farms and other land whose market price depends largely upon the
value of product rather than the cost of producing the capital. Usher's
calculation of effective public ownership was therefore quite delicate
and judgmental. Nevertheless, Usher made a back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation that 58% of the capital in the U.K. is in effect publicly owned.
If this were the appropriate figure, the loss to natives from immigrants
would indeed be very large relative to the "triangle" gain that would
result if effective public-capital ownership by immigrants were zero.
Working with the streams of payments to capital owners and to labor
W3uld avoid some of the difficulties of valuing cpaital that arise in
Usher's method, and I tried to do this earlier. But both this and
Usher's method now seem to me misdirected for illuminating the partic-
ular problem at hand. The reasoning is as follows.
Recall that the aim here is to determine the effect of immigrants
upon natives' Incomes . A calculation of the sort that Usher made (based
on the concept that I, too, used in my 1976 paper), or the sort of cal-
culation that I made working with streams of pajnnents for the conference
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verslon of this paper, may reveal something about the benefits obtained
from the capital by the immigrants themselves . But the benefits to the
immigrant are not the obverse of costs to natives.
Consider Usher's central statement: "When a man migrates from one
country to another, he abandons his share of public property— the use of
roads and schools, the rights to a share of revenue from minerals in the
public domain and so on—in the former country and acquires a share of
public property in the latter, conferring a benefit upon the remaining
resiilts of the country from which he comes and imposing a cost upon the
original residents of the country to which he goes." (p. 1001) This as-
sertion by Usher, to which I also subscribed earlier (1976), no longer
seems correct to me. The most obvious defect is that there are economies
of scale in true public goods. For example, the benefit the immigrant
receives when he or she sees the Statue of Liberty is not balanced by a
corresponding cost to natives, even before or after the immigrant becomes
a citizen and a part owner of the Statue. And to a greater or lesser ex-
tent the same is true of roads, public television transmitters, museums,
military real estate, and wilderness. Furthermore, there is no clear cor-
respondence between the contemporary market value or the original cost
of such public capital, and the benefits derived from it. Therefore we
need a method that directly estimates the effect upon natives rather than
an indirect estimate by way of the benefits obtained by immigrants. And
more specifically, we want to know the effects upon natives' money in-
comes, because estimating the costs or benefits to them of changes in
physical and cultural environment caused by immigrants is not presently
possible.
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The matter turns out to be less inscrutable than It seems at first,
however. The key to the analysis is observing that the total output of
business need not be divided conceptually between the shares of capital
and labor, i.e., the return to labor and capital do not "exhaust the
product" in this context. To put it differently, with respect to the
difference D between total output Y with an immigrant and i without
him or her, the part that goes to capital and the part that goes to
labor do not account for the whole. Rather, government gets a share,
and this share need not be seen as on a different footing than capital's
and labor's shares. Rather, government can be seen as providing a third
sort of service—security, organization, or whatever—for which it is
paid the indirect and corporate taxes it receives. Government is pro-
viding a factor of production which a given business decides not to avoid
using and paying for by moving offshore; the fact that the business de-
cides to remain in the U.S. and pays for the privilege of doing so, just
as it pays for private capital as labor, makes clearer the status of the
government services (or simply permission to do business) as a factor of
production.*
This leaves us with difficulty only (!) in the task of interpreting
the business tax payments with respect to beneficiaries. The amounts
*Access to the labor and services markets within the country are
part of the decision to remain, of course, and one may not wish to con-
sider these as a governmental service. This is a murky matter concep-
tually, but the argument does not depend upon this point. The impor-
tant fact for the argument is that the firm must pay the government if
it is to conduct its business, and the size of the payment depends on
the size of the output, which in turn is influenced by the presence or
absence of the immigrant.
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paid by private business to immigrants can be interpreted as their mar-
ginal product, and the returns to capital are capital's share. That is,
on this interpretation, private capital's share is the amount that pri-
vate capital receives, and the same for labor.
The government's take—14.5% of GDP*
—
goes mostly for current expen-
ditures, and the extra taxes on account of immigrants surely are mostly
offset by current expenditures on immigrants. But some of the tax pay-
ments finance government capital. Only the latter part of the govern-
ment's share, out of the entire additional output D, is a "return to
capital" which the immigrant gets a piece of, and this is likely to be
small relative to D.
There is, however, a "return to capital" which immigrants employed
by government obtain; for such immigrants there is no_ yield from capi-
tal that natives get and immigrants do not. So the relevant estimate
is the proportion of immigrants who work for the government, together
with the return to government capital through taxes on private business
—
the latter a small part of the 14.5% government share, say 5% of D. Or«^
the former, in 1979, 2,773 million persons and 12,840 million persons
respectively worked in federal and state-and-local government, which is
17.4% of a total of 89,497 million employed persons (Economic Report of
the President , 1979, p. 242). And a lower proportion of new immigrants
than natives work for government. All told, this analysis suggests that
immigrants capture less than 17.4% plus 5% of the "return to capital",
which is much less than the 35% which is the basic "conservative" or
upper-limit figure used in the simulation.
*In 1979 ?126.3 billion indirect taxes plus $75.4 billion corporate
taxes divided by $1,380.3 GDP of non-financial corporate business
(Economic Report of the President . 1980, p. 216).
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The analysis given above is much compressed, and a satisfactory
treatment must be of article length elsewhere. I am reasonably confident,
however, of the basic conclusion that the benefits to natives from the
immigrants through the extra returns to private capital are not over-
stated by this analysis and by the 35% figure used; I hope the reader
agrees
.
The importance for natives' incomes of the extent of capital-returns
captured by immigrants can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas model to be
developed later. This partial effect corresponds to the proportion of
the average immigrant's income that is transferred to or from the immi-
grant on one or another assumption of capital-returns capture. If the
immigrant captures none of the returns to capital, the immediate effect*
is very slightly positive (equal to .1% of the immigrant's income). If
the immigrant captures all the returns, there is a negative effect equal
to 32% of the immigrant's income. For other capital-capture proportions,
the effects on natives as proportions of the immigrant's first-year in-
come are, respectively: 10%, -4%; 20%, -8%; 30%, -12%. At the 35%-
capture rate that I judge is an upper bound, the effect is a transfer
to the immigrant equal to 14% of the immigrant's income.**
These calculations agree with Usher's conclusion that the triangle
of benefit to natives in the absence of returns to existing capital
*The longer-run effects in years after entrance, and as the immi-
grant grows older, will be analyzed later.
**These calculations arise from runs of the model with a 4% savings
rate. At a more realistic higher savings rate, the capital-dilution
effect on natives is less over the years.
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captured by immigrants is small relative to the capital dilution cost to
natives at even small proportions of capital-returns capture. But as we
shall see, this effect is swamped by the sum of the other effects.
III. THE INTERGENEEATIONAL TRANSFER EFFECT
Modigliani (1966) and Samuelson (1975) have shown in a different
context that an additional person—and more generally, a positive popu-
lation growth rate—will have a positive partial effect on incomes by
way of existing patterns of life-cycle saving and consumption. This
argviment has not previously been applied to immigrants, but in fact it
applies even more strongly to immigrants than to native births because
the childhood public-consumption portion of the life cycle is not present
with immigrants, as we shall see later in the data on the age distribu-
tion of immigrants.
Though Modigliani and Samuelson talk about the saving of an addi-
tional person that makes him or her increase the incomes of others, we
must notice that pure saving is not meant here, but rather a retirement
system based on transfer payments. If you immigrate, build a barn with
370ur own hands (saving and investment), and then sell milk from it, no
one benefits from the saving other than you. Or if you build the barn
and rent it to me, no one else's income is raised more than if you did
the same construction work on salary for a construction company. It is
your immigrating and then giving ten percent of your salary to the already-
fixed number of native retirees that increases the average income of your
age cohort (by decreasing their contributions to the retirees), and there-
fore the incomes of the natives as a group.
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The existence of this benefit from immigration depends on two as-
sumptions: (1) The public consumption patterns of children, adults,
and retirees are such that an additional complete native family with a
larger number of children than retirees—a family typical of population
growth—transfers more to the rest of the economy in social security
payments in a given year than it consumes in public expenditures on
children plus transfers to retirees; this is the case in the United
States (Clark and Spengler, 1979), though less so in European countries
where child-support transfers are relatively larger than in the U.S.
(2) The age distribution of immigrants when they arrive has more workers
and fewer dependents than the age distribution of the native population.
These are the most important reasons why this second assumption is over-
whelmingly true: (a) Even those retirees who do come with immigrant
families are not entitled to old-age benefits, (b) The age distribution
of immigrants is much more heavily concentrated in the prime working
ages than is the native population, as may be seen in Table 1. On aver-
age, it is the young, strong, and single who migrate. (This is espe-
cially true of illegals; more than 80% are male, half are single [most
of the married men leave their wives and children in Mexico, for ex-
ample]
,
and most are youthful—less than 20% of the workers are over 35,
and they average perhaps 27.) Among the Vietnam refugees, only 12% are
45 or over, compared to 32% for the 45-and-over age group in the U.S.
population as a whole. (There is, however, a larger proportion of young
children among the Vietnam refugees than in the citizen population.)
As to actual emplojnnent, a survey (Opportunity Systems, Inc., 1975-
1977) showed that 47% of the Vietnamese males 14 years or older were
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working within 3 inonths of entry. This rapid job-flndlng jibes with the
results of studies of Immigrant employment In Canada (Manpower and Immi-
gration, 1974), Israel (Russian Immigrants, Shuval et al., 1973) and
United Kingdom (New Commonwealth Immigrants, Jones and Smith, 1970).
These data imply that Immigrants constitute a class which, on net
balance, contributes to natives by age-and-youth transfer payments.
Section VI will discuss whether there are offsetting negative transfer
effects of immigrants through other social-welfare channels.
Table 1
One may wonder whether the net flow of transfers caused by the im-
migrant cohort tends to balance out when the immigrants get older. This
seems so if one looks only at the Immigrants themselves rather than at
the whole sequence of events caused by the entry of the Immigrants,
which Includes their children who then grow up into productive workers.
When the Immigrants get older, the immigrants' own offspring more than
supply the necessary retirement transfers ("more" rather than "equal to"
because of the effect in (1) above). Were this system to be considered
In an equilibrium context, this would not seem to be true. But it is
In the very nature of the entry of each immigrant that It Is a one-time
disequilibrium event, and it is the gains from the difference between
it and an otherwise comparable equilibrium—that is, the system without
the immigrant—that constitute the transfers captured by the natives.
Table 1
Distributions by Age of Legal Immigrants at Entry, and U.S. Population
Age
0-19
20-39
40-59
60+
U.S. Population, 1970
(Social Indicators, 1976, p. 32)
38.0
25.6
22.2
14.2
Legal Immigrants to U.S.,
1967-1973 (INS Data from
Keely and Kraly, 1978)
35.5
46.4
13.8
4.3
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Perhaps a hypothetical example will clarify this important but
elusive point. Imagine that a "native" family consists of you and your
spouse, both now age 35, your three-year-old twins, and your retired
grandfather. My immigrant family consists of my spouse and I, both age
25. Both families pay 20% of our $20,000 yearly incomes in taxes. Your
family now receives Social Security for the grandfather (and various
minor support for the twins) whereas my family receives no such pay-
ments, so on balance you gain from me now. After a few years the balance
will become slightly more even as my spouse and I also have two children,
and forty years later the yearly balance will become roughly equal after
my spouse and I retire and collect Social Security. But since your family
was the net gainer in the early years—the years which weigh heaviest in
a present-value calculation of the "investment" value to natives of ad-
mitting my family as immigrants, a calculation properly made at the time
of the admission decision—the calculation is influenced positively by
the Social Security effect (and to a much smaller extent, by the child
welfare programs) . And the calculation for this one immigrant family
is in no way altered by the fact that other immigrants may or may not
enter in future years.
In passing, it is interesting to notice that the immigrant-saving
effect is the opposite of the negative child-dependency effect that has
been the mainspring of the Coale-Hoover argument against population
growth in less-developed countries. And the life-cycle facts may well
be such that, even in LDC's, over its lifetime an additional child has
a positive net transfer effect on the income of others.
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The actual magnitude of the life-cycle saving effect is roughly
equal to the proportion of an immigrant's salary that goes to fund
social security and other federal old-age programs. At present this
is upwards of 10% of the average salary (Economic Report of the
President, 1977) and the schedule is such that immigrants, who have
relatively low incomes, pay a larger percentage than the average native.
And the social-security percentage is almost sure to rise in the next
few years. So we see that this positive effect is large, and of the
same order of magnitude as the negative capital-returns-capture effect
seen in Section II.*
*No mention is made here of other taxes and transfers with respect
to immigrants. For citizens as a whole, these flows balance out. Because
of the "favorable" age distribution of immigrants and their high rate of
employment, the net effect is almost surely that immigrants pay more in
taxes than the cost of the other services they use. See Simon (1978) for
more details.
A traditional but fallacious related argument in favor of immigra-
tion must be dealt with here. It has been alleged at least since Francis
Walker, the first president of the American Economic Association, that immi-
grants are a better "buy" than additional children because immigrants arrive
with the publicly-financed portion of their educations already paid for by
another country's public (or in more modern argtiments, at a lower cost).
This argument may be appropriate and relevant when historians (e.g., Neal
and Uselding, 1972) look backward, assume some substitution between addi-
tional children and additional immigrants, and reckon the advantage to
having had immigrants. But the argument is not relevant when the discus-
sion is forward-looking (e.g., Blitz, 1977), and the native fertility of
the country of immigration is assumed invariant to immigration; it is
then not reasonable to calculate apparent savings on the education of
immigrants, because sunk costs are sunk for decision-making purposes; the
only question for policy purposes is whether the future native incomes
and outgoes will be on balance more positive or negative with the immi-
grant's presence than without it. Of course an immigrant's education
and human capital have an effect though the gains to capital discussed
earlier, as well as through possible gains to trade (see footnote on
page ). But these effects cannot be estimated by valuing the
cost of the immigrant's education or the cost of the same education
in the country of immigration.
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IV. THE MOST IMPORTANT EFFECT: LONG-RUN PRODUCTIVITY
The likely most important long-run effect of immigrants has yet to
be mentioned, here or in previous economic theorizing on immigration.
This is the effect of immigrants (in their role of additional workers
and consumers) upon the productivity of the country of immigration. To
calculate the importance of this effect on native incomes over the years
requires a dynamic analysis of the sort I have made elsewhere for gen-
eral population growth in MDC's (Simon, 1977, chapters 4-6) though with
a technical progress function less sensitive to population than used
earlier. As we shall see in Section V, this factor dwarfs all the others
in a reasonably short span of time. This section lays the groundwork
for the assumptions that are built into the model in Section V.
Aside from their special characteristics as cultural newcomers and
as non-owners of capital, immigrants represent additional people as
people . Additional people are additional workers and consumers who in-
crease the size of the markets in which they produce and consume.
Productivity per worker is the key factor in the standard of living
of a country. And economists at least as early as William Petty and
Adam Smith have emphasized the importance of the size of the market in
influencing productivity, due to the division of labor and other economies
of scale. In more recent years, economists have also noted the influence
of the size of the market—the total output and income in a market—on
the decision to invest. "The inducement to invest is limited by the
size of market."* Yet recent economists have not drawn the most
*Nurkse (1952) quoted by Agarwala and Singh (1963).
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obvious conclusion from this reasoning: Additional people lead to faster
economic growth by increasing the size of the market, and hence boosting
productivity and investment.
Economies associated with larger plants are usually one's first
thought when considering economies of market scale. And Indeed, larger
plants are more efficient, up to a point. But the most important and
interesting productivity advantages of larger markets arise at the
industry level, or even the level of the market as a whole. Retail
goods, and even most services, are distributed more cheaply in larger
communities, once the wage effect is allowed for (Love, 1978). And in
a general study of the costs of manufacturing production, Sveikaxiskas
(1975) found an economically-important advantage in efficiency in larger
cities. There is also evidence that less capital is needed to produce
a given amount of output in larger cities (summarized by Alonso, 1975).
And the cost of capital is lower in larger communities, as measured by
bank rates (Stevens, 1978, and references therein).
Another important element is the greater density of communications
and transportation networks that accompanies denser population. This
may be seen casually in the larger number of radio and television stations
in larger cities. And Segal (1976) found that SMSA's with populations of
two million or more have 8% higher productivity than smaller SMSA's be-
cause "economies exist in transport and communications in the very largest
cities..." A related phenomenon is the greater propensity to produce new
ideas that accompanies living in larger MDC cities (Higgs, 1971; Kelley,
1972), and the greater propensity for new ideas and trends to diffuse and
be adopted in larger cities (Fischer, 1978). And in LDC's, Glover and
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Simon (1976) have shown in a cross-country study how denser road networks
—
a vital factor for agricultural development—are more dense where popula-
tion is more dense.
Larger markets also induce faster gains in productivity due to
competition, and to "learning by doing". An example of the competitive
effect: The January White Sale—-a costless commercial innovation—was
adopted decades earlier in big cities than in small cities, on the average
(Simon and Golembo, 1967); the obvious explanation is the pressure of
competition. As to learning: the more television sets or bridges or air-
planes that a group of people produces, the more chance those people have
to improve their skills with learning by doing, a very important factor
in the increase of productivity. The increased efficiency of production
within firms and industries as experience accumulates has been well docu-
mented in many industries starting with the air-frame industry in the
1930's (see e.g. references in Rosen, 1972, p. 369). The bigger the pop-
ulation, the more of everything that is produced, which promotes learning
by doing.
The most relevant evidence on market size and economies of scale
comes from studies of industries as wholes. It is an important and well-
established phenomenon that industries which grow faster increase their
efficiency faster—even compared with the same industries in other coun-
tries. The most complete analysis is that of Clark (1967, p. 265), who
compares the productivity of U.S. industries in 1 '50 and 1963 (and of
U.K. industries in 1963), against U.K. industries in 1950.* The larger
*The US-UK comparisons in the same year are relatively free of the
potential bias arising from the fact that those industries where world
technology grew faster exogenously were also those whose scale of pro-
duction therefore expanded faster, a bias which afflicts analogous time-
series studies within a single country.
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the industry relative to the 1950 U.K. base, the greater is the produc-
tivity difference, and the effect is large. This argues that faster
population growth—which causes faster-growing industries—leads to
faster growth of productivity.
How do immigration, population size, and population growth come
into the picture?* The source of improvements in productivity is the
human mind, and the human mind seldom is found apart from the human body
.
And because Improvements—their invention and their adoption—come from
people, it seems reasonable to assume that the amount of improvement
depends on the number of people available to use their minds.
This is an old idea, going back at least as far as William Petty
in 1682:
"As for the Arts of Delight and Ornament, they are
best promoted by the greatest number of emulators.
And it is more likely that one ingenious curious man
may rather be found among 4 million than 400 persons
. . . And for the propagation and improvement of use-
ful learning, the same may be said concerning it as
above-said concerning . . . the Arts of Delight and
Ornaments ..." (1682)
More recently, this effect of population size has been urged upon us by
Kuznets (1960).
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that "technological advance"
does not mean "science", and scientific geniuses are just one part of
the knowledge process. Much of technological advance comes from people
who are neither well-educated nor well-paid—the dispatcher who develops
a slightly better way of deploying taxis in his ten-taxi fleet, the
*The following paragraphs are taken from Simon (forthcoming)
.
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shipper who discovers that garbage cans make excellent cheap containers
for many items, the supermarket manager who finds a way to display more
merchandise in a given space, the supermarket clerk who finds a quicker
way to stamp the prices on cans, the market researcher in the supermarket
chain who experiments and finds more efficient and cheaper means of ad-
vertising the store's prices and sale items, and so on.
The potential contribution of additional producers of knowledge
to resources and the economy is manifest. Bethe, who has excellent
credentials to speak on the topic, says that the future cost and avail-
ability of nuclear power—and hence the cost of availability of energy
generally—would be a better prospect if the population of scientific
workers were larger. Talking specifically about nuclear fusion and a
device called Tokamak by the Russians:
Work on machines of the Tokamak type is also going for-
ward in many other laboratories in the U.S., in the
U.S.S.R. and in several countries of western Europe.
If the problem can be solved, it probably will be.
Money is not the limiting factor: the annual supuport
in the U.S. is well over $100 million, and it is in-
creasing steadily. Progress is limited rather by the
availability of highly trained workers, by the time
required to build large machines and then by the time
required to do significant experiments. (1976)
A casual inspection of the historical record confirms this specula-
tion. There have been many more discoveries and a faster rate of growth
of productivity in the past century, say, then in previous centuries,
when there were fewer people alive. True, ten thousand years ago there
wasn't much knowledge to build new ideas upon. But seen differently,
it should have been all the easier ten thousand years ago than now to
find important improvements because so much still lay undiscovered. Pro-
gress surely was agonizingly slow in pre-history, however; for example.
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whereas we develop new materials (metal and plastic) almost every day,
it was centuries or thousands of years between the discovery and use of,
say, copper and iron. It makes sense that if there had been a larger
population then, the pace of increase in technological practice would
have been faster.
For the twentieth century there is some statistical evidence.
For the period 1950-1962 for the U.S., Denison (1967, pp. 287, 298, 300)
estimated yearly growth in output of .76% due to "advances in knowledge"
(which excludes the effect of education on the labor force), and .30%
due to "economies of scale", for a total just over 1%. For Northwest
Europe he estimated ,76% due to "advances in knowledge", .56% due to
"changes in the lag ik application of knowledge, general efficiency,
and errors and omissions", and .41% due to "economies of scale", for a
total of something over 1.5% per year. Solow's estimate of the increase
in output in the U.S. due to increases in technical knowledge for the
40 years from 1909 to 1949 is about 1.5% per year.
If a larger labor force cuases a faster rate of productivity change,
one would expect to see this reflected in observed changes in the rate
of productivity advance over time in the United States as population has
grown. And indeed, Solow (1957, p. 320) concludes that the yearly rate
of change of productivity went from 1% to 2% between the 1909-1929 and
1929-1949 periods, and Fellner (1970, p. 11-12) found these rates of
productivity increase: 1900-29: 1.8%; 1929-48: 2.3%; 1948-66: 2.8%.
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These results are consistent with the assumption that the rate of increase
of productivity is indeed higher when population is larger.*
The connections between numbers of scientists, inventors, ideas,
adoption and use of new discoveries are difficult to delineate clearly.
But the crucial links needed to confirm this effect seem very obvious and
strong. For example, the data show clearly that the bigger the population
of a country, the greater the number of scientists and the larger the amount
of scientific knowledge produced; more specifically, scientific output is
proportional to population size, in countries at the same level of income
(Price, 1967; 1975; Love and Pashute, 1978). The U.S. is much larger than
Sweden, and it produces proportionately more scientific knowledge.
In brief, the knowledge that leads to technological advance is created
by people. Various readers may have reservations about one or another of
the lines of evidence presented above. But they all fit together and con-
firm each other. Taken altogether, the evidence seems to me irresistible
that the more people, the more technological advance and productivity in-
crease, ceteris paribus. And immigrants are people.
V. THE INTEGRATED MODEL INCLUDING THE PRODUCTIVITY EFFECT
If an economist is to be worth his (her) keep, she (he) must take ac-
count of the size and importance of the various effects, and calculate the
*The recent downturn in U.S. productivity change may be seen by
some as a reversal in the long-term trend of an increasing rate of
productivity change. In my view, however, to the extent that the data
are meaningful rather than showing compositional effects, this downturn
is more likely to be a pause than a basic change. I think that the
very-longest-term trends are the most reliable basis for characterizing
basic economic forces, and productivity seems to have been increasing
at an increasing rate for hundreds of years.
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ket effect. One can only obtain a satisfactory overall assessment of the
effect of immigrants on the standard of living of citizens by constructing
an integrated model of the economy, and then comparing the incomes produced
by the economy under various conditions of immigration and population growth.*
For simplicity and clarity, the model deals with a single cohort
of immigrants; a continuous analysis yields similar results, however.
Also for simplicity, I sometimes talk of a representative family instead
of the cohort as a whole.
The question is whether the native population—that is, the people
living in the U.S. before the immigrant family arrives—are better off or
worse off economically if the immigrant comes or does not. In more pre-
cise terms, we wish to know if the lifetime income of the (average member
of the) native population is higher or lower if the immigrant comes, that
is, whether
V V V V
Z > Z or Z > Z .
m n n m
Lifetime incomes with and without the immigration are, for our purposes
here, functions of gross income less taxes
*After finishing this article I discovered an interesting model by
Ekberg (1977) which also makes technical progress endogenous in a migra-
tion context. Ekberg uses a Kaldor-like function, where the increment to
technical progress depends upon the percentage change in the stock of
capital, which I elsewhere argue is not very appropriate for a study of
this sort. My 1976 article on Russian immigration into Israel is the only
other study of the sort of I know of.
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m in,t=l m,t=l m, t=z m, t=2
and
^l = K t-l - ^I t-l> -^ ^<^n t-2 - ^I t-2> -^ •••n n, ± n, i , —z n, =z
Therefore, we must estimate the natives' yearly gross incomes and taxes
if there are, and if there are not, immigrants.
The Effect of Immigration Upon Gross Incomes of Natives . We start
with the effect of the inmigrant on natives' incomes through the two major
lines of influence: a) the capital-dilution effect, and b) the economies-
of-scale-and-productivity effect. I have estimated the combined effect of
these two forces in a simple macro-model. The main conventional element
is a Cobb-Douglas function whose labor and capital coefficients add to
unity, and where saving is a fixed steady-growth proportion of the prior
year's output. A less-conventional element is the effect of output and
labor force on the technological-level coefficient, as discussed in Simon
(19 77, chapters 4-6). In other recent work I have explored a wide variety
of technological process functions, and have found that, in a policy con-
text such as this one, the result is rather insensitive to the choice of
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functlon. I have chosen Phelp's well-known and elegant function,* which
is "conservative" in this sense: Phelp's function indicates that tech-
nical progress should have been progressively lower as population growth
has declined in the 20th century in the U.S. and in the Western world
generally. In fact, technical progress has apparently been higher in
the more recent decades than in the early decades of this century as
discussed earlier. This implies that Phelp's function understates the
contribution of popxilation size and growth to the advance of economic
welfare.**
*Phelps' original function is
*t-w-l
A
,
h
i\]
Ift-v-lj
The number of research workers, R, may be considered proportional to the
labor force, and w is a "retardation factor" to represent the delay in
adoption of newly produced knowledge. Phelps makes h —
rt-w-l/
concave argument because, he says, this assumption is necessary if "an
exponential growth of researchers will produce an exponential increase
of the level of technology" (p. 134).
This function has the realistic properties that (a) more persons
imply more knowledge, (b) there are diminishing returns at a given
moment, and (c) a larger stock of knowledge to a larger increment of
knowledge.
**Phelps' function can be made more realistic with the addition of
arguments representing the effect of educational level and national in-
come on the production of technology, with the function still retaining
its convenient mathematical properties. See Steinmann and Simon (forth-
coming)
.
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In place of the size of the research force In Phelps' function, I
have for simplicity used the size of the labor force, and the fimction
was written in Cobb-Douglas form to make its meaning obvious:
\ - Vi = ^^t-1 ^t-1 ^'^ = ''
The exponents are those that fit Phelps' requirement that the function
be homogeneous of degree one, and his assumption that "if the technology
level should double we would require exactly twice the amount of research
to double the absolute time rate of increase of the technology" (p. 135).
The assumption of the steady-state savings rate is also "conservative"
in the sense that it is less advantageous to a larger population (and
hence to immigrants) than would be a higher savings rate; this is reason-
ably clear upon inspection, and is verified in other work by this writer.
The coefficient b is that complement of the initial values chosen for
A and L which starts the simulation smoothly into motion and which cor-
responds to the steady-state rate of change of A in the non-immigrant
case, which is equal to the rate of growth of the labor force in Phelps'
model; it is kept the same in the plus-immigrants case so as to hold
all initial conditions exactly the same in the two cases except the
growth of the labor force; this, too, is a "conservative" assumption
in the sense explained above.
An iterative program is used to make investment approximately a
function of current-period income rather than prior-period income, so
that the computer model would approximate the steady-state analytic
model; the results are much the same with and without this refinement,
however.
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The other equations and parameters of the model are as follows:
^t ^t^t\
\ = ^^-1 + Vl
The Initial values are A = 1.0, K = 1000, Y = 500, a = .67, S> = .33,
y = .5, A = .5, and b is chosen so the initial rate of change of A = .02
yearly. The initial L = 1000 for the without-immigration case, and 1020
for with immigration case,*
For the income-effect calculations the increment of immigrant workers
in period t=l must be large enough so that the effects are not obscured by
rounding error. It was therefore set equal to the 2% increase in native
labor force in year t=l (10% in some runs to show that the size of the
increment matters little). Then the difference in citizens' incomes in
future years between the situations (a) if the immigrants do come in t=l,
and (b) if they do not come, are calculated. The final calculation is in
terms of the effect of one additional immigrant.
Because there is many a possible slip between the theoretical con-
ception of a model, and the results as produced by a computer simulation.
*There would appear to be no danger here that the choice of produc-
tion function forces the outcome, as in some studies of distributive shares,
The cohort of imm1 grants whose effect is analyzed is small relative to the
native population, and hence its effect upon the overall distribution be-
tween capital and labor.
Additionally, Ekberg (1977) experimented with a CES function and ob-
tained the same results as with a Cobb-Douglas model.
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and also because this simulation program is so easy to decipher, the
program is attached as an appendix and the researcher is offered the
opportunity to inspect it himself or herself.
Section III discussed the extent to which immigrants gain the re-
turns from the capital with which they work. Table 2 shows various
calculations which should cover all possible values; 35% is the value
that I have continued to work with because I now think it is at the
very high end of probable values for the U.S., in light of the earlier
discussion; any lower value shows immigrants to be even more favorable
for natives' incomes.* On the latter assumption, the pre-tax effects
on citizen's incomes amount to the percentages of the immigrant's net
income shown in Column 4. Those figures may be interpreted as follows:
In year 1, citizens' incomes are (in the aggregate) lower by 14% of the
income of the average immigrant, aside from taxes (though ^iiwfr the ef-
fect on individual natives is very small because of the small proportion
of immigrants relative to natives). By year 12, citizens' net incomes
are higher than they woxild otherwise be, because of the immigrants. By
year 19, citizens' incomes are higher by an amount equal to 10% of the
income of each immigrant who arrives in year 0.
*The reader may wonder about how the representative immigrant's
share of capital, and the returns to it, changes with years of resi-
dence in the U.S., and whether this is reflected in the model. With
time, the immigrant's share rises to 100%, of course. But this is
counterbalanced by purchase payments by immigrants which are neces-
sarily financed by higher- than-average saving. Hence the result should
be the same whether this is explicitly shown in the model, or implicitly
as in the present model.
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Table 2
Now we must take account of the immigrants' saving-and-transfer
effect as discussed in Section III. Social security is the main issue.
Immigrants collect no social security, both because of age distribution
and because of not obtaining any benefits in the present. But the im-
migrant family's contributions will be roughly 10% of earnings. This
makes the overall accounts be positive in year 5 and thereafter, and
just slightly negative in years 1-4, as seen in Column 6,
The stream of negative and positive effects may be evaluated just
like any other investment with negative outgoes at the beginning and
positive incomes later on. On a capital-returns assinnption of 35%, the
rate of return on the "investment" decision to bring in an immigrant
is 9.3% per annum without the social security effect, and 19.3% with it,
an excellent investment by any standard.*
The results of a variety of other specifications of the basic model
with respect to savings rate, initial rate of technical progress, pro-
portion of returns to capital captured by immigrants, and exponents of
the technical progress function are shown in Table 3. The very lowest
rate of return for any reasonable set of parameters is 0% (not a nega-
tive rate, however) for the results without the transfer-payment effect,
and 10% with it. So immigrants are an excellent 10%-retum-per-annum
investment even under these most "conservative" of parameters.
Table 3
*11.1% and 21.1% for the larger increment of immigrants.
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Table 3
Rates of Return on Investment in Immigrants
for a Variety of Models (Increment of Immigrants
Equal to 2% of Labor Force in t=l)
Rates of Return Per
Capital
Capture
Annum in Percents
Without With Social
b s Y,A % Social Security Security
.02 .04 .5 .2 18.4 28.4
.02 .04 .5 .35 9.3 19.3
.02 .04 .5 .5 5.1 15.1
.02 .07 .5 .35 12.2 22.2
.02 .07 .5 .5 7.3 17.3
.02 .10 .5 .35 14.8 24.8
.01 .04 .5 .5 1.5 11.5
.01 .04 .4 .5 0.0 10.0
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VI. DISCUSSION
In discussions of the economic impact of immigrants on natives'
standard of living, transfer payments and social welfare programs (other
than social security) are often suggested as a negative offset to the
positive effects of the immigrants. In fact, however, immigrants seem
to have an overall positive effect through these other transfers. One
reason in the case of the U.S., is the simplest kind of economies of
scale with respect to the defense budget—which is likely to be invariant
to the number of immigrants, in which case immigrants reduce defense
expenditures per citizen.
As to whether immigrants are disproportionate gainers from transfers
because of having low income, Chiswick (1978) has shown that only a few
years after entry into the U.S. immigrants typically approach or equal
natives in income, at which time their taxes should be roughly equal.
And preliminary findings from my analysis of the 1976 Survey of Income
and Opportunity show that the difference between other welfare payments
to immigrants and to natives is small compared to the difference in
Social Security payments.
Concerning illegals. North and Houston (1976) found that 73% of
illegal aliens had Federal income tax withheld, and 77% paid Social
Security tax—even though they can never collect on it. On the other
hand, the proportions who use welfare services are small: medical,
27%; unemployment insurance, 4%; child schooling, 4%; federal job train-
ing, 1%; food stamps, 1%; welfare payments, 1%. And practically no il-
legals or Cubans or Indo-Chinese are in a position to avail themselves
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of the most expensive welfare programs of all: Social Security and
other aid to the elderly.
The reader may wonder whether a person need live in the United
States in order that the U.S. get the benefit of the person's impact
on productivity. The answer differs somewhat depending on the person's
origin, whether a more-developed or a less-developed country. The
answer may also depend on the person's education and occupation, but
the former is more clear-cut and probably much more important.
Recall that a person may influence technical progress through
both his/her demand for goods and her/his supply of knowledge. Let us
consider each of these separately beginning with the more problematic
case, that of the person who already lives in a more-developed country
such as Sweden or Japan.
It is indeed true that there is international trade, and a Swede's
demand for goods may be satisfied in the U.S. But it is also true, and
more relevant, that only a very small proportion of U.SI goods are sold
abroad. It is more likely that an increment of U.S.-made auto's or news-
papers or sncke detectors will be sold if a given person chooses to re-
side this year in the U.S. rather than in Sweden. This should be enough
to make the point. But an even more conclusive argument comes from a
more general view of trade: If a person comes to the U.S. and still
imports a Swedish auto, Sweden's imports (directly or indirectly) from
the U.S. will rise by the amount of other goods equal in value to the
auto. Therefore total production in the U.S. will rise by the amount
of the immigrant's output and income, along with an effect through
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learning-by-doing and other demand-induced productivity-Increasing
mechanisms
.
We must also consider, however, whether the flow of technology from
among developed countries is so free that it does not matter in which
country the technical progress is first made. By now there seems to be
consensus among students of the subject that it does matter, for a
variety of reasons. For one thing, there is a time lag of, say, a min-
imum of three years. Second, much technical progress is a matter of
local adaptation, such as new agricultural varieties and techniques that
depend on particular soil and climatic conditions ; this is why even in-
dividual states within the U.S. can get a high return on R&D in agri-
culture (Griliches, 1958; Evenson, 1968).
If a person goes from a poor country where little new technology
is being created, to a rich country where much technology is being
created, the argument above is obviously even stronger. Here the U.S.
benefits not merely by the person contributing to technology that will
be differentially helpful to the U.S., but also by the absolute incre-
ment of technology that the person creates. The more technically ad-
vanced (relative to the state of the art) is the industry a person
works in, the greater the opportunity for that person to advance the
state of the art, it would seem.
It is not a contradiction to this line of thought that the rate
of economic growth per capita has been as high or higher in the poorer
countries as in the U.S. in the post-World War II period. The poorer
countries can take advantage of the technological progress in the
richer countries much more than the reverse.
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A more difficult question is: Should not the larger of two coun-
tries that is at the same level of per capita income grow faster, if
this line of thought is correct? Yes it should—and the evidence,
sketchy as it is, seems to show that absolute size is an economic ad-
vantage, ceteris paribus (Chenery, 1960; Denison, 1967).
In brief, on reasonable assumptions immigrants have a positive dis-
counted effect on citizens' incomes, starting almost immediately and
getting large quite rapidly.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The subject is the effect of an additional immigrant upon the
incomes of "natives" of a country like the U.S. This model confirms
that the possible gain through increased returns to native capital if
the immigrants receive only their marginal product is small relative to
the loss if immigrants receive a realistic proportion of the returns to
capital, as argued by Usher. But the lifecycle saving-and-eransfer
process works in a positive direction for natives, and is of the same
order of magnitude as the capital-dilution effect. Hence adding the
savlng-and-transfer process almost, or more than, offsets the capital-
dilution effect.
The effect of the immigrant upon productivity, however, must also
be taken into account though it has been omitted from previous theorizing
about the effects of immigrants. This is the sum of learning by doing,
creation of new knowledge, and economies of scale of various sorts.
Within a few years, the productivity effect comes to dominate the results
-32-
aad dwarf the capital-dilution and saving-and-transfer effects, yielding
a very high rate of return to natives on "investment" in immigrants, on
any reasonable parameters.
M/D/172
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C1.2).INVETC1)
POOGSl.'i PgPDlII CUTPJT)
«E4L 3,4LPHi,8tTA,L,4.''-a,3 = LTAfA,L,H,X,y,YL,<y,?LC,0T,DK,rL,H,CA,CS
REAL KK.YT, INVETtCPrSH
REAL NPV.iNPV.RATEt^ATEl ,R ATE2 t DNPV, AONPV
ISTEGER I,J,S,rEAR,0,N
3IHENSi:s n(230,2)f <( 20 7,2), U( 200,2), YC 200, 23, XC 200,3 ),Yc ARC 200)
OI.'IENSION aYC200,2),YLC200,2),PLC(200,2)
OI'IENSION !CKC230,2),YYC230,2),INV£TC200),ILC2)
N=ino
,CPTSH=.35 ^
~TUC1)=.32 •
—
IL(2)=.04
CA=.5 —
CS=.3*
4LPHA=.67
3£T4=.33
G4.1i«A = .5
0ELTA=.4 ^
4=1.
N<1,1)=1.
i'(l,2) = l.
L(l,l)=1030.
LC1,2)=1303.
KC1,1)=1003.
KCl, 23 = 1003.
Yd, 13=500.
Y(l,2)=500.
OYC1,1)=.02
DYC1.2)=.02
3=. 02/(LCl.l)*«. 5)»C^C1. 13»«.5)
YLci,i)=Yci,i)/Lrrrn •
YLC1,2)=YC1,2)/LC1,2)
PLC(1.1)=.5
PLC(1,2)=.5 -
YEAR(1)=1
INV£T(1)=1.
R4TE1=.3001
RATE2=4.
RATE = (R4TEl*-*4T = 2)/2.
PRINT 21
PPINT 22
PRINT 23,YcAR(l),N<l,l),LCl,l),KCl,
12),LCli2)fHCl,2),YCl,2),Yl.Cl,2),?LC
DO 12 1=2,
N
YEARCI)=I
IrCI.GT.2)IUC2)=.02
S = I-1
00 10 J=l,2
HCI,J) = '<C';,J)*3*CL(S,J)*».5)«CMCS,J)**.5)
Trr,j3=L(s, j)*TL(j)»LCs,j) - —
-
KKC:,J)=CS«YCS,J)+<CS,J)
YYCI,J)=CA»A«CMCI,J)«LCI,J))«*AL?Ha»HKCI,J)««3ETA
KCI,J)=CS»YYCI,J3+KCS,J)
TCI,J3 = CA«A*C'^CI,J)*LCI,J))»«ALPHA*lCCI,J3*«aETft
YLCI,J)=YCI,J)/LC1, J)
PLC(I,J) = CY(I,J3-<)lCI, J)-<CS, J3))/LCI,J3
INVET(I)= CYCI,2)-CYCI,2)«.67«<LCI,2)-LCI,l))/l.CI,2))3/LCI,l)
PRI'JT 23,Yr4-JCI),MCI, 1) , LC 1 . 1 ) ,KCI , 1 3 , Yd . 1 3. YL CI , 1) , PLCCIt 1) tMC Ii
12),LCI,2 5,<CI,2),YCI,2),YLCI,2),PLCCI,2 3,INV£TCI3
DO 11 1=2,
S
XCI,2 3 = rLCI,l)«100./'YLCl,l)
XCI,3) = INV£TCI3»100./I'iV£rC13
XCI,'r) = YLCI,2)»10C./YLCl,2)
XCI,S) = (XCI,3)*Cl-C'TSrl))*CXCI,4)*C?TSH)
XCI,5)=LCI,l)«C:NVETCI)-rLCI,l)3/CLCI,2)-LCI,133/Yl.CI,2)/.67
XCI,7)=CL(I,13«CYLCr,2)-YLCI,l)))/CCLCI,2)-LCI,13)*YLCI,2))
XCI,3 3 = CLCI,l)*CCnW£TCI)«Cl-CPTSh))+C YLCI,2)»CPTSH)-YLCI,1)))/CCI.
1CI,2)-UCX.1))«CCYLCI,2)«.67»C1-CPTSH3)*CYLCI,23»CPTSH333
PRINT 23,rE4RCI),CXCI,3),a=2,8)
DO *1 J=l,20
NPV=0.
00 40 1=2,50
DN?/=XCI,3)/C1.*^AT:)»»I
4DNP/=43SC3'IPV) .
IFC1DNPV.LT..0001) ;0T3 43
,'JPV=:4PV»-0NPV
ANPV=AeSCNPV)
IFCiNPV.LT..00313GO T3 42
IFC"?V.GT..O) GO TO 63
^iT52=«iTE
RAT£ = CSiT = l + :?4T£23/2.
GO TO 41
;?ATE1=S4TE
RATE = CRATEl*-<4TE2)/2.
PRINT 50,RATE,>JPV
PRINT 50,SATE,NPV
FnR''ATC2X,5H-(4TE = ,r5.7_ . 10X,4a«)PV = ,F10.4)
23 FORMAT CI4,F9.4,3F3.1,2 = '5.4 ,4X,F?.4,3F3.1,3F8.4/)
FO^'IATCIHI ,14X,17HWIT'iaUT I M I GR ANTS , 41X , 1 4 H J I TH IHIGRANTS/)
FaR''ATC2X,4HrE4R, 9H H ,3H U ,3H K ,3H Y
:3H Y L .aH PLC ,4X,3H
23H Y ,3H Y L ,3H PLC
23 FjR''4TC/,I4,4F9.2,3.= 9.4)
STOP
£N0
M
1 oH
,3H
INVET /)
,8H
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